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This dissertation investigates issues relating to optimal income taxation and pen-
sion policies in a developing economy with a large informal sector. First, we devel-
oped a two-sector general equilibrium overlapping generation model with endoge-
nous formal-informal labor supply and human capital investment to characterize
the optimal capital and labor income taxation in developing economy with large
informal sector. For the quantitative analyses, Ghana is used as an example given
its large size of informal sector employing about 88% of total workers. We found
that in an economy with large informal sector, capital income should be taxed at
a rate higher than that of labor income tax. This result comes from the fact that a
labor income tax still distorts human capital investment and this necessitate a pos-
itive capital income tax to mitigate the negative impact of labor tax. In addition,
even if informal sector can be taxed, optimal tax design still requires a non-zero
capital income tax due to the presence of human capital investment which will be
more elastic compared to financial savings. Thus, neglecting informal sector in tax
design would lead to understating optimal capital income tax and overstating labor
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income tax and the difference is quantitatively significant.
Second, we developed an applied partial equilibrium life cycle model that con-
sists of overlapping generations of 60-period lived individuals facing mortality risk
and individual income risk to investigate the role matching contributions and pay-
ments options in influencing participation and contribution to informal pension
schemes in developing countries. The model was calibrated to data from Ghana
for the quantitative analyses. The simulations results suggest that matching con-
tributions (pension saving subsidy) targeted to informal workers could be a potent
instrument to encourage voluntary participation and contribution by informal work-
ers pension schemes. The policy proposal would be welfare improvement resulting
from the redistribution of income from the rich formal workers to the poor informal
workers, insurance against risk of poverty from annuity, intra-generation redistri-
bution through accidental bequest from mortality premium and reduction in self
control costs. In addition, Our results indicate that targeted matching contributions
(pension saving subsidy) to informal workers increase savings unlike redistribu-
tion for social pensions (or unconditional redistribution). The study also showed
that mandatory annuitization of pension savings with 0% of matching rate would
improve participation, contribution, savings and improve welfare of the society.
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